Ownership Structure and the Earnings Management Practices of Nigerian Companies by Obigbemi , Imoleayo Foyeke
 
 
Journal of Internet Banking and Commerce 
 
An open access Internet journal (http://www.icommercecentral.com) 
 
Journal of Internet Banking and Commerce, May 2017, vol. 22, no. S8 
 
Special Issue: Mobile banking: A service provider perspective 
Edited By: Mihail N. Dudin 
 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES OF NIGERIAN 
COMPANIES 
OBIGBEMI IMOLEAYO F 
Department of Accounting, Covenant University, Canaanland, Ota, Ogun 
State, Nigeria 
Tel: 08035939951; 
Email: imole.obigbemi@covenantuniversity.edu.ng 
OMOLEHINWA EDDY O 
Department of Accounting, University of Lagos, Akoka, Yaba, Nigeria 
MUKORO DICK OLUKU 
Department of Accounting, Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State, 
Nigeria 
 
Abstract 
The ownership of a business is a major factor in its survival and progress rate. It is 
assumed that the going concern nature of a business depends solely on its ownership 
structure which may also be determined by its size and capital base. Reviewing the 
financial reports of 137 sampled companies, this study examined the role of ownership 
structure on earnings management practices of Nigerian companies. Earnings 
management was measured using the magnitude of the discretionary accruals. The 
study tested the effect of ownership structure on earnings management. The OLS 
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regression technique was used to measure the research model as well as the Pearson 
Moment Correlation Coefficient. The study shows that ownership structure has a 
significant relationship with earnings management practices in Nigeria. It further 
revealed that there is a positive significant relationship between management ownership 
and family ownership with earnings management. Also, there is a negative significant 
relationship between block ownership with earnings management practices in Nigeria. 
This study recommends that business regulators at all levels should monitor the 
ownership structure of companies operating in Nigeria. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Diverse studies have considered the role of ownership structure on firm performance 
both in developed and developing economies [1-5], with most of the studies identifying 
ownership structure as a factor influencing the performance of companies. However 
company performance as reported in the published financial reports can also be 
affected by other factors such as environmental, managerial efficiency as well as 
institutional framework. These other factors affect performance, What are the factors 
responsible for the accuracy and credibility of financial reports and what is the role of 
ownership structure on the earnings management practices of companies in Nigeria? 
Earnings management as defined is the act of identifying the gaps in the financial laws 
and the usage of such to the advantage of a selected group of financial report users and 
not to the benefit of all the users [6]. It is the process of presenting the financial reports 
of companies as expected and not as it is. It is the use of devious actions by those 
saddled with the responsibility of preparing the financial reports which may be at the 
expense of the other stakeholders [7]. One example of management’s deviation from 
shareholders’ interests is the management of earnings with the use of accounting 
accruals [7-9]. The Nigerian code of corporate governance was published in 2003, with 
the assumption that adherence to the contents of the code will increase the confidence 
placed on the economy by both local and foreign investors [10]. It was also assumed 
that an increase the credibility of the financial reports of Nigerian companies, which will 
thereafter translate into increase in foreign investment [11]. 
 
The Nigerian code of corporate governance in an attempt to reduce the power the board 
of directors has on the company states that all stakeholders should have equal 
information about the financial wellbeing of the company they have interest in. It was 
also stated that the shareholdings of the members of the board should be adequately 
disclosed in the published financial reports [12]. The code further stated that there must 
be a representative of the minority shareholders on the board, which is to ensure that 
the operations of the board and the decision making process is not left in the hands of 
few individuals. However, studies have identified that ownership structure of companies 
is a major tool in ensuring good corporate governance [7,13]. 
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Corporate governance has been attributed as a tool for reducing earnings management 
practices in Nigeria [6], then what is the effect of ownership structure, which is a 
component of corporate governance on earnings management practices of Nigerian 
companies? 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Ownership Structure and Good Corporate Governance 
 
Concentration of ownership or ownership structure refers to the proportion of share 
ownership by a certain number of individuals, institutions or families. It is the percentage 
of a company’s shares owned by a certain number of institutions, individuals or families 
[4]. It explains the type of ownership that exists within an organisation. Ownership of a 
corporation may be that of family business, which is a situation in which the largest 
percentage of the shares is owned by individuals who are related by blood. Ownership 
can also be vested on members of the management team with a high percentage of the 
shares of the company. This type of ownership is the management ownership. Block 
ownership is a type of ownership with a large proportion of the shares of a company is 
held by an individual or an institution. The various forms of ownership have their own 
merits and demerits and also inform the type of operations that go on within the 
organisation and performance [4]. 
 
Management Ownership 
 
This ownership system is the process by which members of the management of a 
company hold a large part of the shares of a company. This term is also known as 
insider ownership. Under this form of ownership, the owners of the company are also 
the managers of the company. Researchers have argued that this form of ownership 
has a direct impact on the performance of the company [4,14]. Though it was also noted 
that the activities of a business enterprise as it relates to high performance requires 
hard work on the part of owner-managers which in turn requires concerted energy. This 
therefore means personal characteristics and capacity of the owners-manager will 
determine the success or failure of the business enterprise. Thus, businesses with 
management ownership that achieve high performance within the business place 
greater value on hard work and personality vitality and health than owner-managers 
who perform low performance [14]. 
 
Corporate governance has been identified as the solution to the agency problems, and 
one of the agency problems has been identified as the short-term targeted profit from 
the management versus the long-term profit which is required by shareholders. 
Consequently, the separation of ownership has led to various conflicts and 
controversies between shareholders, stakeholders and eventually opportunistic 
managerial behaviour [15]. 
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Block Ownership 
 
Block holders are those individuals who have large proportion of a company’s shares 
per time. The block holders have the largest proportion of the shares of a company. 
Research has it that block holders use accounting information for their own personal 
benefit [7]. Concentrated ownership, which is the act of having more than 10 percent of 
a company’s shares in the hands of an individuals or institutions have been 
acknowledged to provide incentives for large shareholders to monitor management. As 
the ownership stake of large block holders increases, there is the incentive to increase 
firm performance and monitor management than other shareholders [16]. The block 
holders due to their interest and investment in the company are more active than other 
shareholders in the company, which is aimed at achieving the objective of maximizing 
return on investment. 
 
Earnings Management and Ownership Structure 
 
A look at the role of ownership structure on earnings management practices gives an 
insight into the expectation theory, which is what drives decisions made by individuals 
per time. Every investor at the point of making an investment decision has an 
investment objective at heart, which is principally to maximize return on investment. 
Return on investment can only be maximized when profit is made. However, deviation 
from the expected return makes the investors agitate, in a bid to protect their interest. A 
greater concentration of ownership in hands of major shareholders who are interested in 
maximizing returns on investment can lead to greater incentives for them to obtain 
private benefits through any means available [4]. One of the ways through which the 
value of a firm is maximized is through well designed ownership structure of the firm’s 
shares. Literature has it that ownership in the hands of few can be bad for the 
governance of the firm since it gives the largest shareholders discretionary powers of 
using the firm resources to serve their own interest at the expense of other 
stakeholders, which is earnings management [17]. Earnings management reduces the 
informative value of financial statement, which is highly dependent on the incentives 
and motives managers have to manipulate earnings for their own personal gain [15]. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This study adopts the empirical, quantitative and analytical form of research. Earnings 
management was measured using the magnitude of discretionary accruals as estimated 
by the performance matched modified Jones model [7,9]. Performance-matched 
discretionary accrual measure was adopted for measuring the level of earnings 
management, as it is noted that it enables researchers draw more reliable inferences 
[7,18], while the contents of the financial reports were used to determine the ownership 
structure of the 137 selected companies. 
 
With the research hypothesis as stated below: 
 
H0: Ownership Structure of Companies does not have a significant effect on earnings 
management practices in Nigeria. 
JIBC May 2017, Vol. 22, No.S8 - 5 -  
 
Using the model below: 
 
EEMit=β0 + β1MOPit+ β2BlockOwnit + β3FamBizit+ ei 
 
Where: 
 
EEM: Earnings Management proxied by the absolute value of the residual from the 
performance matched modified Jones model. 
MOP: Management Ownership Percentage 
BlockOwn: Block Ownership 
FamBiz: Family Business 
e: residual 
Expected Apriori: β1, β2, β3>0. 
 
Thus: 
 
β1>0; implying that the higher the percentage of Management Ownership, the higher 
the earnings management practice, 
β2>0; implying that the higher the availability of Block Ownership, the higher the 
earnings management practice, 
β3>0; implying that the higher the percentage of Family Ownership, the higher the 
earnings management practice, 
 
This expectation is based on past findings that corporate governance mechanisms 
should deter earnings management practices in organisations when effectively followed 
and strictly monitored by the regulators [7,9,19]. 
 
The frequency weight was applied using the company weight outlier as a result of 
varying company size, samples and characteristics. The model is significant at 1% level 
of significance, the regression therefore gives the result as presented [20,21]. 
 
RESULTS/FINDINGS 
 
The result of the analyses for 137 sampled companies is as presented in Tables 1 and 
2. 
 
Table 1: Correlation Matrix. 
 
 Dac Mgtown blockown famibiz ROA 
Dac 1.0000     
Mgtown 0.0855 1.0000    
Blockown 0.0191 .01190 1.0000   
Famibiz -0.0255 0.4845 0.0749 1.0000  
ROA 0.0339 0.0575 -0.1221 0.0947 1.0000 
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The correlation matrix as presented above shows that there is no high correlation 
between the dependent variable (Earnings Management), the independent variables 
and the control variable. There is low correlation between the independent variables 
and the control variable. Thus this is an indication that the regression for the dependent 
variable and the independent variables can be done. It further shows that the control 
variables are of good fit. 
 
H0: Ownership Structure of Companies does not have a significant effect on earnings 
management practices in Nigeria 
 
EEMit=β0 + β1MOPit+ β2BlockOwnit + β3FamBizit+ ei 
 
The model is significant at 1% level of significance, the regression therefore gives the 
result presented. 
 
Table 2: Tabular Presentation of Results for Ownership Structure. Source: Research 
(2013). 
 
Variables t-value P>[t] Sig Coef Std. Error 
MgtOwn 55.44 0.000* 5.78e-06 1.04e-07 
BlockOwn -5.12 0.000* -.0000315 6.14e-06 
FamiBiz 1.68 0.092*** .000018 .0000107 
ROA 25.48 0.000 .000865 3.39e-06 
Constant -3.16 0.002 -.0000187 5.92e-06 
*Significant at 1% significant level, ***Significant at 10% significant level 
 
Table 2 shows that there is a positive significant relationship between percentage of 
Management Ownership and earnings management practices of Nigerian companies at 
1% significance level. This shows that the higher the percentage of management 
ownership, the higher the earnings management practices of Nigerian companies. 
 
The test also shows that there is a negative significant relationship between Block 
Ownership and earnings management practices of Nigerian companies at 1% 
significant level. This shows that the higher the block ownership, the lower the earnings 
management practices of Nigerian companies. 
 
The test further shows that there is a positive significant relationship between family 
business and earnings management practices of Nigerian companies. This result 
therefore shows that family owned companies are likely to engage in earnings 
management practices than companies that are not family owned. 
 
Decision: With reference to the result of the test as presented above, the null hypothesis 
is rejected and the alternate hypothesis accepted, to conclude that Ownership Structure 
of Nigerian Companies have a significant effect on earnings management practices. 
 
There is a positive significant relationship between management ownership and 
earnings management in Nigerian companies, which shows that companies with high 
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management ownership percentage have high earnings management in Nigeria. 
Showing that the higher the management ownership, the higher the earnings 
management. This can therefore be as a result of managements’ strive to get more 
returns from their savings, which will ultimately affect the survival of the business. 
Family business has a positive and significant relationship with earnings management 
practices in Nigeria, thus the involvement of family members in a company will result in 
an increase in the earnings management practices of companies in Nigeria. 
Furthermore, there is a negative and significant relationship between block ownership 
and earnings management in Nigeria, therefore, the higher the block ownership, the 
lower the earnings management practice. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
From the results, there is a significant relationship between management ownership of 
companies in Nigeria and their earnings management practices. It further concludes 
that there is a significant relationship between block ownership and earnings 
management practices of companies in Nigeria and family ownership has a significant 
impact of the earnings management practices of companies in Nigeria. 
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